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Massachusetts found herself represented by independent-minded John Quincy Adams. A year earlier, Adams had defeated staunch Federalist Timothy Pickering just in time to make himself the sole New England Federalist to vote in favor of implementing the acquisition of Louisiana, thereby rendering Massachusetts complicit in her own subjugation by the slaveholding Virginia interest. More dispiriting, Alexander Hamilton lay dead on the field of honor, shot by Aaron Burr, vice president of the United States, losing Federalist candidate for governor of New York-and, it was rumored, the man who would have delivered his state into the Northern Confederation when the High Federalists led New England out of an increasingly untenable union.
To heap insult on injury, as the year reached its dismal end, Harvard
College, the institutional center of Massachusetts Federalist political culture, found itself under siege from within. Since the August 1803 death of Professor David Tappan, the university had faced a vacancy in the Hollis
Professorship of Divinity, the oldest endowed university chair in the United
States.2 Then, in late September 1804, Harvard President Joseph Willard died as well. The year-and-a-half-long struggle to fill these vacancies exposed a fissure in New England Federalism, a rift that played itself out as theological liberals and trinitarian Calvinists struggled for control of the university. Politicians and clergy who had previously worked together to combat the twin evils of democracy and infidelity now ranged themselves on opposite sides of the religious question, with the dominant High
Federalists casting their considerable weight on the side of the liberal clergy, making possible their ultimate victory. In doing so, they revealed a great deal about the peculiar social and political synthesis that distinguished the Massachusetts Federalists from other wings of the party and about the forces that led to their defeat in public life.
The conventional view of the Harvard dispute has focused on the revolutionary (albeit, to the outsider, somewhat parochial) changes that followed in its wake, treating the affair as the first skirmish in what is known to historians of American religion as the Unitarian controversy.3
The initial phase of that ostensible revolution came with the February 1805
Pearson, then acting president and presiding officer of the Harvard Corporation.6 Although Wright's account broadened scholarly understanding of the reasons behind Ware's election, he maintained the prevailing focus on the Hollis Professorship. This perspective led Wright-like those before himto emphasize the revolutionary nature of the electoral outcome because of the theological change it involved.
It is the contention of this essay that the elections of 1805 and 1806
represented not a revolutionary change in the direction of the university, but a successful assertion of power by the existing Massachusetts Federalist elite-a group that had controlled Harvard life without interruption at least since the Revolutionary War. This elite comprised a closely-knit network of conservative politicians and liberal clergymen; each ascribed to the other's intellectual principles and both shared the same cosmopolitan personal habits and outlook.7 In the events of 1805 and beyond, this network was responding to a threat to its social and political leadership from an evangelical Federalist faction, emanating from Connecticut and led by the Reverend Jedidiah Morse, a Yale graduate. Indeed, evidence indicates that lay Federalist politicians bore the laboring oar through the electoral controversy out of concern that an evangelical victory would limit
Harvard's role as the training ground for the next generation of like-minded Federalist leaders. Taking a broader perspective, it can be argued that the political and religious difficulties of the Massachusetts Standing Order were two sides of the same coin; the relatively broad coalitions that formed both Federalism and established Congregationalism before 1800 each fell victim to the rancorous party spirit that characterized the evolving democracy of the early republic.8
6 Wright, "Election of Henry Ware," 246. In keeping with his emphasis on personal factors, Wright had earlier suggested that Jedidiah Morse's personal agenda-to remake Massachusetts ecclesiastical politics in the image of Connecticut where the conservatives of all denominations made common cause against the liberals, there represented by the Episcopal clergy-was a critical element in the maneuvering that resulted in the electoral controversy. Wright, Beginnings of Unitarianism, 269-71.
7 Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard College, 185 ("Harvard in politics has always reflected the sentiments of the economic ruling class in Boston."). Wright aptly observed that, in an age of increasing secularism and democratic tendencies, the "continued prestige of the ministry depended, not only on the survival of Christianity, but also on the preservation of a social structure in which the role of the minister was a significant one." The clergy therefore "preached Federalism as well as Christianity, believing it was all the same battle." Wright, Beginnings of Unitarianism, 249.
The political aspect of this dynamic informed Ware's election to a degree previously unrecognized, but is most apparent in the events surrounding the subsequent selection of university president. The Corporation's initial and unanimous choice for the office was Fisher Ames-native of Dedham, graduate of Harvard, attorney, four-term congressman for Boston, political controversialist, leader of the so-called Essex Junto,9 and the personal embodiment of Hamiltonian High Federalism. Despite his frequent paeans to the importance of religion in forming the habits of republican virtue, Ames's own religious views, if any, were obscure. Ames was, as one scholar has delicately put it, "not the most ardent of believers."10 When Ames declined the presidency on account of ill-health, the struggle for ascendancy within the college resumed. It lasted through the ensuing election of Samuel Webber and was only resolved in 1810, with the accession of Webber's successor, the Reverend John T. Kirkland, a theological liberal with extensive High Federalist political connections.
When both professorial and presidential elections are treated as part of a single campaign for control of the university, it becomes clear that, although personal animosities and theological allegiances figured into the maneuvering, political factors were an overarching element in the dispute-specifically, the effort of Massachusetts Federalist politicians to retain primary influence in college affairs for themselves and their longstanding clerical allies. From their perspective, it may be argued that the election of theologically orthodox candidates-and the victory of the orthodox group-would have worked a more significant break with the college's existing cultural and institutional identity than did the supposedly revolutionary selection of theological liberals to occupy key university offices.
exclusion and denunciation." Ibid., 3. Wright suggests that the orthodox faction was already distancing itself from the more cosmopolitan social practices of the liberals during this period. Ibid., 9-10.
9 David Hackett Fischer, 'The Myth of the Essex Junto," William & Mary Quarterly, 21 (Apr. 1964), 191-235, argued that the Junto, as an organized political entity, existed only in the minds of its enemies. However, contemporaries used the term-whether seriously or in jest-and understood broadly to whom the term applied. See John Adams to Benjamin Rush, Sept. 30, 1805, "it was indeed my unchangeable adherence to this principle [refusal to enter treaties with European powers] that turned those whom you call tories and which the Bostonians call the Essex Junto against me in the election of 1800," in John R. Schutz and Douglass Adair, eds., The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush
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Much has been written about the gruesome demise of Federalism and, from the vantagepoint of history, it may seem obvious that after the election of 1800, the party's days of influence on the national scene were numbered.
But, in 1804, Massachusetts Federalists did not have the advantage of that historical perspective; they believed themselves to be part of a still viable, although embattled, political culture. As proof, they could point to the fact that the Federalist party still dominated the Commonwealth's government and would continue to do so until Harrison Gray Otis lost the 1823 gubernatorial election; not until Andrew Jackson's 1824 election did they lose all realistic hope of a Federalist revival.
Thus, Federalist political leaders joined issue in the Harvard controversy in order to preserve the institution that was a critical part of both their past-forming the "ancient manners" that made New England "to excel every other people that existed in the world"-and their futurereadying a new Federalist generation for the moment when "political Fortune" might smile once again.1 Their conduct provides an opportunity to study the often neglected complexities of High Federalist culture at home, at a time when it stood in surly opposition elsewhere. What emerges is further support for a developing scholarly reconsideration of High Federalism, viewing it not as a coterie of recalcitrant crypto-monarchists but as a movement that embodied an Enlightenment brand of elitism-noblesse oblige.'2 Thus, the High Federalists consistently rejected the emotional turmoil of democracy, whether in the form of the French Revolution or the Second Great Awakening, in favor of an urbane Augustan vision in which the wise, the good, and the well-to-do united to govern an orderly and virtuous people for the common weal. As a result of this temperamental distaste for disorder, High Federalists embraced what might seem to be the unlikely combination of reactionary social philosophy and avant-garde theology. Faced with a universe in flux, theirs was a world in which the personal often merged with the political. Although the Federalists did not always rise to the level of their own principles, they understood only too well the value of personal tolerance and the perils of fanaticism, esteeming JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC rational inquiry and moral behavior over abstract creeds, and, as the Harvard controversy demonstrated, personal character over all.
In the years between the Revolutionary War and the election of 1800, both Federalism and Congregationalism in Massachusetts united a wide range of views and interests in pursuit of a single goal: the defeat of irreligion and the maintenance of a virtuous and stable community based on a social hierarchy that reflected the natural distinctions among men. It was a tightly-knit world in which "everyone who was anyone" knew everyone else, and all were bound together by ties of blood, friendship, marriage, and a Harvard education. Nevertheless, by the turn of the century, this shared background and objective concealed growing differences. In a few years, ministers would look back to the halcyon days when men of all theological opinions exchanged pulpits with one another as a matter of course, just as politicians would lament the spirit of party that caused men who had worked together for years to cross the street in order to avoid one another.
In those more harmonious times, clerical and political elites enjoyed a remarkable uniformity of political and social views; on most subjects, they spoke with one voice. If politician Fisher Ames could sum up an entire world view by announcing that "liberty depends upon our education, our laws and habits, to which even prejudices yield, on the dispersion of our people on farms, and on the almost equal diffusion of property;... on morals and religion, whose authority reigns in the heart; and on the influence all these produce on public opinion, before that opinion governs rulers," Timothy Pickering might toast, "Religion and Morality, essential supports [of] a free government," and the Reverend John T. Kirkland could define American equality as "an equality which secures the rich from rapacity, no less than the poor from oppression; the high from envy no less than the low from contempt."'3 If David Tappan warned his congregation that "the most celebrated states and kingdoms of the earth have arisen by virtue and fallen by "vice," then Fisher Ames could draw the lesson by proclaiming that Jefferson' s first election was a "great moral revolution proceeding from the vices and passions of men," and the gloomy Reverend Nathaniel Emmons could FEDERALISTS POLITICS AND UNITARIAN CONTROVERSY 583 worthless, the dishonest, the rapacious, the vile, the merciless and the ungodly." After Jefferson's reelection, both Ames and Morse lamented-in almost identical words-that hopes of a Federalist revival were small when money-making remained the chief objective of the electorate. Thus, Morse confided to a friend that "It is no easy matter to rouse men who are devoted to the acquisition or the enjoyment of wealth, to act vigorously in any cause," and Ames asked pointedly, "when all who are not devoted to pleasure, are eager in the pursuit of wealth, how will it be possible to rouse such a spirit of liberty as alone can secure or prolong its possession?"'4
At the same time, all Federalists-laity and clergy alike-knew that the continued stability of republican New England rested on what Fisher Ames called the "old habits and sober reasons of the people." But, faced with Jefferson's second term, Ames was moved to wonder whether even "the force of ancient manners" was now sufficient to protect New England from the "wild destroying rage of the southern Jacobins." On the eve of the Harvard controversy, the same thought issued from Jedidiah Morse, who admonished his congregation that a true Federalist and patriot must be willing "to venerate and by all means preserve uncorrupted, those institutions, which our fathers planted in their wisdom and piety, watered and cherished with their tears and their prayers, and defended with their blood," concluding, "We cannot leave to our posterity a richer inheritance than these institutions in their primitive purity."15 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC Even while such agreement reigned, there were signs that the unity of the Standing Order was not perfect. In 1796, a celebration of George Washington's birthday merited upwards of 3,700 lights on the Harvard campus; three years later, the Corporation felt impelled to maintain an increasingly delicate ideological parity by recommending both Timothy Pickering and Elbridge Gerry for honorary degrees.16 By 1800, Federalist politicians regularly grumbled to one another about the Republican fondness for "speculative principles"; particularly to the High Federalists, politics was an empirical art, a "business."'7 From this perspective, it was but a short step to view private morality and religion as one thing and public politics as quite another. Thus, when southern congressmen suggested that a duty on molasses would promote temperance among the poor of the rumdrinking North, Representative Ames tartly responded, "I treat as idle the visionary notion of reforming the morals of the people by a duty on molasses.... We are not to consider ourselves, while here, as at church or school, to listen to the harangues of speculative piety; we are to talk of political interests committed to our charge."18 As evangelical mores advanced throughout the country, successively placing liquor, theatergoing, and novel-reading outside the bounds of middle-class life, such views would sound increasingly out of date.
Nevertheless, after the 1800 election, clergy and politicians once again joined forces, brought together by the challenge of the Jeffersonians' superior party organization. When Fisher Ames proposed launching a Federalist newspaper modeled after the Republican press, one of his first plans was to give free subscriptions to the New England clergy, in the expectation that they would make use of them to mold a Federalist local opinion from their pulpits. As it was, when The New England Palladium first went to press in time for the 1801 state elections, its contributors read 18 Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., 1st sess., 231-32. Ames drew a similar distinction with regard to Madison's July 1794 "Resolutions," observing that the matter concerns "not our feelings but our interest, yet the debate has often soared high above the smoke of business into the epic region." Ibid., 3d Cong., 1st sess. well as ministers Jedidiah Morse, Eliphalet Pearson, John T. Kirkland, and David Tappan, whose death triggered the dispute. As this roster indicates, in 1801, clergy of all shades of theological opinion could still labor as one in the interests of Federalism;19 in three years, the same men would be bitterly ranged against one another in a dispute that had reverberations in the political arena.
To start with the conventional story, the Harvard controversy began in For a year, Willard delayed the choice, evidently hoping that a moderate Calvinist would emerge to carry the field. Then, in late September 1804, Willard himself died and the college faced a second key vacancy. To be absolutely precise, Harvard faced three important vacancies in the fall of 1804, since one of the fellows, Dr. Simeon Howard, had died at the end of August, a few weeks before Willard. As events unfolded, this third vacancy proved critical in filling the first two.
In response to the openings in the university administration, the Board of Overseers met and advised the Corporation to hold an election for a new fellow before proceeding to the other offices. At the same time, the overseers recommended that the Corporation fill the professorship before the presidency. By the end of October, the Corporation had implemented the first suggestion. Dr. John Eliot, minister of the New North Church in Boston, was formally selected a fellow of the Corporation; with his liberal theology and extremely close personal ties to the High Federalists, Eliot became the eminence grise of the electoral maneuvering that followed.
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There were now six members of the Corporation, the university's executive governing body. Since the presidency remained unfilled, the As deliberations were about to begin in late fall, the fellows found themselves under public pressure from a spate of letters appearing in the Boston press. For example, "Amicus" (probably Jedidiah Morse) warned Massachusetts parents that Harvard's leadership was "rather inclined to elect Unitarians or those styled rational Christians, who even deny the proper divinity of the Savior" to both the professorship and the presidency, leaving the education of their sons to "loose and erroneous hands."21 On the other side, Ware's supporters suggested that the university was delaying the appointment in order to divert the Hollis Professor's endowed salary to improper uses.
In late December, this war of correspondence provided the first overt signs that Federalist political forces were mobilizing against the orthodox. The editor of the strongly Federalist Centinel, which until then had been affording an active platform for both sides, refused to print a letter from "Calvinus," an orthodox correspondent. At the same time, the Centinel announced that it would not publish any more letters relating to the Harvard elections. In response, "Fair Play" claimed censorship, accusing the Centinel of attempting to persuade other newspapers not to publish 
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Calvinus's letter and asserting that the only reason for the cut-off was that letters were no longer running one-sidedly in favor of Ware.
As if to demonstrate the plausibility of Fair Play's charge, several weeks later, the Centinel permitted "Constant Reader," a Ware supporter, to offer a last word. While applauding the decision to end the newspaper debate, Constant Reader used the opportunity to summarize the establishment Federalist position for the public: "whether the candidates for the Presidential and Theological Chairs, be Calvinists, Arians, Socinians, or Latitudinarians, is not of so much importance, as whether they are learned, pious, moral men."22 It was a formula that would sound over and over again in Federalist writings-both public and private-about the controversy.
During late fall, events were also beginning to move within the university. From the very first, as Wright observed, personal factors affected the deliberations. On December 4, the Corporation's first meeting after Eliot's election, the college treasurer, Ebenezer Storer, already a strong supporter of Ware, urged immediate action on the professorship, presumably reflecting discomfort at the public charges of financial had always supposed had an influence on his mind. He is ill humoured he is ever ill mannered. Upon this occasion he threw the foam of Billingsgate upon me, thinking he had the right to abuse me as I was a new member. He had two or three hours talk to no purpose but to pour out his own opinion, which had not the weight of a straw on our minds-nor had they much more solidity than a bubble." "Megalonyx" was a reference to Thomas In deference to Pearson, the Corporation did not formally vote to seek the advice of the overseers. Instead, the fellows requested that the board meet to deal with other business, apparently assured that someone would raise the matter of the Hollis Professorship. This expectation was amply justified by the fact that three of the fellows were also members of the Board of Overseers; Lathrop and Eliot were Boston ministers and Judge Wendell was a member of the governor's council. In addition, as we shall see, Lathrop and Eliot enjoyed close ties to other overseers likely to be present and supportive of the liberal agenda.
Fifteen overseers attended the meeting on January 3, 1805. As Wright observed, it doubtless was one of the liberals who suggested that the deadlock could be broken if the presidency were filled at the same time as the Hollis chair; indeed, there is some evidence that the suggestion came from Lathrop himself.27 The opposition replied that this decision was so significant that it deserved the attention of "all the Overseers and Society" as the college charter required in momentous matters.
Once put to a vote, however, a motion to refer the matter to the whole board failed, and the Corporation was instead advised to choose a president "with all convenient speed." The orthodox were infuriated by this maneuver, since Lathrop and Eliot had not disqualified themselves as overseers from giving advice to themselves in their capacity as fellows of the Corporation. As Eliphalet Pearson observed, had they refrained from consequences that would follow from placing a Unitarian in Harvard's official pulpit:
What effect this change in the religious character of the Professorship, and of the University will gradually and ultimately produce in the state of our Churches, and on the religious and moral character of our citizens, cannot with so much certainty be foreseen. In respect to New England, it is an untried experiment. GOD forbid, that this change should be injurious and ruinous; that in consequence, the faith of our churches should become less pure, their discipline less strict, the standard of christian morality lowered, the difference lessened between those, who professedly serve God, and those who avowedly serve him not; till at length the spirit and power of our religion shall have evaporated, and its very forms be abolished.35
To Morse, the election was not simply a choice between differing theological creeds, it was a struggle to preserve intact the institutions that had created the New England character, itself the only bulwark against Republicanism. Ware's appointment threatened the "spirit and power" of Massachusetts Congregationalism and, as Morse saw it, was the first step down the road to the abolition of "its very forms," the end of the statesupported establishment. Without a commitment to true religion-that is to say, orthodox Calvinism-morality would be weakened and the very One reason that most historical accounts focus on the Hollis
Professorship is a practical concern; after Ware's election, the primary sources falter and contemporaneous secondary accounts become sketchy.
The college records themselves reveal little about the presidential deliberations once the Hollis Chair was filled. The surviving excerpts from Eliot's journal are limited to Ware's election. Eliphalet Pearson composed his January 1805 manuscript in an effort to influence public opinion about the Hollis Chair; when events moved too fast for him, he left the piece in draft. Given Pearson's ambition to become college president himself, he could not write about that election without accusations of impropriety. Morse's version of events was published within weeks of the overseers' February 14 meeting; it too lacked an account of the presidential contest. Yet this silence does not mean that the impending presidential choice was not on the minds of all involved. Private speculation abounded, much JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC of it centering on liberal minister John T. Kirkland.39 Nevertheless, it is clear that the participants did not consider control of the college fully settled by Ware's election; in particular, the theological liberals did not believe their power to be secure. Taken in this light, the polemics rushed into print after the overseers' vote reflect the parties' jockeying for public support in the upcoming presidential election.40 Indeed, sources indicate that the High Federalists were working actively behind the scenes to install one of their own in the post; although, by its nature, the Hollis Professorship had to go to a clergyman, there was precedent for a layman to serve as president of the university.
Pearson remained the leading orthodox candidate for the presidency; defeat in the matter of the divinity chair had done nothing to blunt his personal ambitions. To the contrary, his service as acting president seems to have enhanced Pearson's desire to assume the office permanently. Nevertheless-theology apart-Pearson had made himself thoroughly obnoxious to all those around him. Looking back to his own college days, one admittedly hostile insider, the liberal John Pierce, recalled Pearson as "austere, conceited, & pedantic, to a high degree," while remarking that "[a]t College he was considered exceedingly partial, having favorites for whom nothing was too good, & butts whom he delighted to torment." Among his enemies it was even said that Pearson had been "ultra-liberal" until Willard's death, when he "suddenly claimed to be orthodox in theology: & the change was so sudden & thorough, without the appearance of better motives, that a large proportion of his old friends considered him as merely acting a part."41 39 Ibid. (If Ware is confirmed, "Dr. Kirkland of Boston will be pushed for President... then the revolution will be complete; this ancient fountain will be poisoned and its streams henceforth be the bane of evangelical religion.); cf., Bentley As discussed earlier, it appears that Pearson and Morse were right. A remarkable number of those opposing the orthodox-and playing pivotal roles in the meetings of the Corporation and the Board of Overseers-were connected through a single organization that enjoyed extremely strong ties to the High Federalists, namely, the Wednesday Evening Club. And, Dr. John Eliot-the man who endured the "foam of Billingsgate" at Pearson' s hands-stood at the center of these overlapping constituencies. After the Revolutionary War, Boston had developed a network of literary, scientific, and social organizations that supported the close relationship between the region's lay and clerical elites to the benefit of both. The primary actors in these organizations were the liberal clergy. The Wednesday Evening Club stood at the pinnacle of these associations; its "membership list ... The connections between the Wednesday Evening Club and High Federalist politics ran especially deep; almost from its inception, the club had enjoyed the role of political king-maker. Among its members, both Fisher Ames and Josiah Quincy held the Boston seat in the House of Representatives; both owed much of their political support to the circle of conservatives led by the Wednesday Evening Club. In particular, Ames's early political successes-the publication of a series of letters condemning Shays's Rebellion, election to the Massachusetts ratifying convention for the federal constitution, and his narrow victory over Sam Adams for Boston's seat in the House-followed closely on his election to the Club in 1786. By 1805, as the Harvard controversy unfolded, Ames stood at the very heart of that group of unreconstructed conservatives known to their enemies as the Essex Junto; he was the grand old man of Hamiltonian Federalism in New England. Quincy, for his part, had just embarked on his public career: he was a member of the Massachusetts Senate in 1804 and 1805, holding his seat in Congress from 1805 to 1813. In 1805, Quincy, along with Samuel Dexter, was also a member of the central committee of the Massachusetts Federalist party.
While serving in the House, both Ames and Quincy remained in close contact with the club, transmitting political gossip, soliciting and receiving political advice. Some of the liveliest and most astute accounts of Congress between 1789 and 1796 appear in Ames's regular letters to his "constituents" in the Wednesday Evening Club. The letters were addressed to Ames's friend, attorney George Richards Minot, and read aloud to the assembled membership. An index of both the club's intensely political atmosphere and the close ongoing ties of its clerical and political members throughout this period appears in an 1809 letter from John Eliot to Josiah Quincy in which Eliot playfully relayed the following message from John Kirkland: "He told me to tell you, however, this club was a dull scene since you left B*. While J. Q. A. was here we could not talk politics." The "J. Q. A." was, of course, John Quincy Adams, also a member of the club. The closing paragraph demonstrates the insular nature of this world: Eliot cheerfully reported the probable increase of Federalism in New England even while the party was struggling on the national scene.47 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC As 1805 wore on and Harvard's presidency remained vacant, Pearson continued to block every other plausible nominee. According to Josiah Quincy, writing long after the fact, "To the candidates for the president's chair, proposed by the other members of the Corporation, his opposition was uniform; a decision was postponed until more than a year had elapsed after the death of President Willard."48 In fact, the decision was postponed until December 11, 1805, almost fifteen months after Willard's death. On that day, the fellows of the Harvard Corporation met and "After considerable discussion, written votes were brought in for a President of Harvard College, from which it appeared that the Hon. Fisher Ames, Esq. was unanimously elected."49 The nature of that "considerable discussion" is unclear as are the identities of the other nominees under consideration.
Presumably the names that had already been floated in the February 1, 1805, trial ballot remained under consideration. These included John T. Kirkland, who, at thirty-five, was probably too young to be elected, but whose name repeatedly had surfaced in the early running. Wright states that, under Morse's influence, Pearson proposed "Dr. Smith," probably Samuel Stanhope Smith, then president of Princeton, "Dr. Green," likely Ashbel Green who became president of Princeton in 1812 when Smith resigned, "Dr. Cutler," the Reverend Manasseh Cutler of Beverly who was prominent in Federalist politics, and "Mr. Mellen," the Reverend John Mellen, a former Harvard Tutor, Dudleian lecturer and a member of both the Historical Society and the American Academy. The first two were middle Atlantic Presbyterians, and, therefore, men whose commitment to creedal orthodoxy would be unacceptable to the other fellows and to a majority of the overseers as well.50
The Corporation seized on Fisher Ames as a compromise candidate, but with little hope that Ames, whose declining health had been common knowledge since he retired from Congress in 1796, would accept the post.
As reported by Sidney Willard, son of President Willard and college librarian in 1805, based on his "conversation with the Fellows," the choice of Ames "probably, was made with little expectation that the office would be accepted by him, and might seem to indicate a wish on the part of the 48 Quincy, History of Harvard University, 2:286. 49 Entry of Dec. 11, 1805, Records of the Harvard Corporation, 77. 50 Wright, "Election of Henry Ware," 256n; Bentley, Diary, Entry for Mar. 16, 1806, 3:219, supports the view that age as well as theology worked against Kirkland although he "was the best qualified man that could be found."
